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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-2821 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
PATRICK PARKER, 
Appellant                        
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00304-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 25, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 4, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendant Patrick Parker appeals his criminal sentence for wire fraud and money 
laundering convictions.  He contends that the District Court erred in applying a 
2 
 
sentencing enhancement for using sophisticated means.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm.
1
   
 Parker was employed as a mortgage loan broker for various companies.  For two 
properties, Parker prepared fraudulent mortgage loan applications in the names of straw 
purchasers.  The various lenders accepted these applications, and approved mortgages for 
$270,480 and $454,171.  In connection with the closings on those properties, Parker 
received commissions of $21,337 and $3,704.  He deposited those funds in accounts for 
shell companies that he created in order to facilitate his fraud.  Then, the straw purchasers 
transferred the deeds to the properties to Parker for the sum of $1.  As owner of these 
properties, Parker then nominally sold these properties back to straw purchasers, again by 
preparing fraudulent mortgage loan applications.  He again received commissions for 
these sales, and deposited those funds in accounts held by the shell entities.   
 Additionally, Parker arranged for mortgage financing to pay off an existing lien on 
one of the properties.  The new lender provided a payoff check in the amount of 
$362,509.71, which Parker misappropriated.  Parker opened a bank account under a 
corporate name chosen to resemble the payee on the check, and falsely endorsed and 
deposited the check into that account.   
 Parker pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and 
one count of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  We review the District Court’s fact findings supporting 
application of the enhancement for clear error.  See United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 
415, 418 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 569 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc)).    
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(a)(1)(B)(i).  The District Court sentenced Parker to seventy months’ imprisonment, 
based on extensive calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Court found that 
the counts should be grouped under § 3D1.2(b), and to do so, it calculated the offense 
level for each individual count.  For the wire fraud count, the Court applied § 
2B1.1(a)(1), and determined a base offense level of 7, to which the Court added 14 levels 
because the offense resulted in a loss greater than $400,000 but less than $1 million, see § 
2B1.1(b)(1).  Next, the Court added 2 levels pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) because it 
determined that “the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means.”  Therefore, the 
adjusted offense level on the wire fraud count was 23. 
For the money laundering count, the Court applied § 2S1.1(a)(1), which imports 
the adjusted offense level—in this case, 23—from the wire fraud count to the money 
laundering count.  Next, the Court added 2 levels pursuant to § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) because 
the defendant pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.  Therefore, the adjusted 
offense level on the money laundering count was 25.   
To arrive at a single offense level for the two counts, the Court applied § 3D1.3(a), 
which calls for adopting the higher of the two adjusted offense levels on the two counts—
in this case, 25.  Then, the Court subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, see 
§ 3E1.1, arriving at a final adjusted offense level of 22.  With a criminal history placing 
Parker in Category IV, the advisory sentencing range was sixty-three to seventy-eight 
months. 
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Parker’s only objection on appeal is to the District Court’s application of the 
“sophisticated means” enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C).2  That provision calls for a 
2-level increase in the offense level if “the offense otherwise involved sophisticated 
means.”  Application Note 8, in turn, defines “sophisticated means” as  
especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the 
execution or concealment of an offense.  For example, in a telemarketing 
scheme, locating the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but 
locating soliciting operations in another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates 
sophisticated means.  Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, 
through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial 
accounts also ordinarily indicates sophisticated means. 
 
Id. at cmt. n.8(B).  Parker argues that one specific act of money laundering, i.e., opening 
a bank account under a corporate name chosen to resemble the payee of the check, which 
was to pay off the mortgage, and then falsely endorsing and depositing it, did not 
constitute “sophisticated means.”  But this argument misses the point; the enhancement 
was applied based on the entire scheme Parker concocted, not solely on one act of money 
laundering.  The District Court correctly concluded that application of the sophisticated 
means enhancement was warranted based on the entirety of Parker’s conduct, which 
involved, among other things, the use of straw buyers and shell companies created to 
broker fraudulently obtained mortgages.  This constitutes “[c]onduct such as hiding assets 
or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities [or] corporate shells.”  § 
2B1.1(b)(9)(C) cmt. n.8(B); see also United States v. Septon, 557 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 
2009) (concluding that a defendant was subject to the sophisticated means enhancement 
                                              
2
 Parker’s brief incorrectly asserts that the District Court applied the sophisticated means 
enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(3).   
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where he “used a variety of business entities to facilitate his fraudulent scheme,” and 
submitted fraudulent loan applications). 
 Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
